Mixed Race Studies

Passing, Traveling and Reality: Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of Race

Noûs
Volume 38, Issue 4 (December 2004)
pages 644–673
DOI: 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00487.x

Ron Mallon, Associate Professor of Philosphy
University of Utah

Among race theorists, the view that race is a social construction is widespread. While the term ‘social construction’ is sometimes intended tomeanmerely that race does not (as once believed) constitute a robust, biological natural kind, it often labels the stronger position that race is real, but not a biological kind. For example, Charles Mills (1998) writes that, ‘‘the task of those working on race is to put race in quotes, ‘race’, while still insisting that nevertheless, it exists (and moves people)’’(xiv, italics his). It is to “make a plausible social ontology neither essentialist, innate, nor transhistorical, but real enough for all that” (xiv). Racial constructionism, thus conceived, is a metaphysical position that contrasts both with the view that race is an important biological kind (racial naturalism) and with the more recent claim that race does not exist (racial skepticism). The desire for a constructionist metaphysics of race emerges against the background of a cluster of normative disputes, including:

1. Labeling Practices: Is the use of any racial terms to pick out various human groups or subgroups by arbitrary bodily features useful or permissible?
2. Terminology: Should term x be used in social life, social theory or social science?
3. Significance of Racial Identity: What is the value of racial identification of oneself or others? Is racial identification morally significant? Is the social enforcement of racial identification morally permissible? Is it morally required?

To simplify, we can characterize these normative disputes as disputes over the value of ‘race’ talk. By ‘‘‘race’ talk’’ I mean talk that uses ‘race’ and other race terms including terms such as ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘Asian’, etc. to classify people (including oneself) or differentially treat them. A rough characterization of these normative disputes has it that at one pole of these debates short-term eliminativists want to eliminate ‘race’ talk quickly (e.g. Appiah 1995, D’Souza 1996, Muir 1993, Webster 1992, Zack 1993). At the opposite extreme, long-term conservationists hold that racial identities and communities are beneficial and that ‘race’ talk—suitably reformed from the excesses of racism—is essential to fostering them (e.g. Outlaw 1990, 1995, 1996). In between these two extremes, there are many who believe that race talk is necessary (and perhaps inevitable) in at least some domains in the short term because of the pervasive existence of racial division and the effects of such division in modern life but who differ with regard to its long term value.

Normative disputes give rise to a concern with the metaphysics of race because of the role metaphysical arguments play in supporting normative conclusions. For example, Naomi Zack argues that “the ordinary concept of race in the United States has no scientific basis” (1993, 18), and K. Anthony Appiah writes that, ‘‘the truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to do for us’’ (1995, 75). According to Zack and Appiah, ‘race’ talk makes reference to a set of racial properties that literally do not exist, and, for each, this provides a reason to eliminate such talk as mistaken. According to this line of argument, the correct metaphysical position (racial skepticism) provides a reason to endorse a particular answer to the normative question (eliminativism). Like their eliminativist opponents, short and long-term conservationists about ‘race’ talk argue from a metaphysical (constructionist) account of race to conclusions about the need for ‘race’ talk. We can see this appeal in Lucius Outlaw’s claim that, ‘‘For most of us that there are different races of people is one of the most obvious features of our social worlds’’ (1990, 58), as well as in Mills’s insistence that race “exists” and “moves people.” Such theorists argue that theories or policies that do not make reference to race leave something out (e.g. Outlaw 1995, Mills 1998, Omi and Winant 1986, 1994, Root 2000, Sundstrom 2002).

But what is this thing? Constructionist theorists are loath to embrace racial skepticism, but they (like racial skeptics) wish to avoid a commitment to racial naturalism. Instead, constructionists hope to chart a third metaphysical option, one that holds that race exists, but as a product of particular social practices. But what, exactly, does it mean for race to be socially constructed? In recent years, a variety of philosophers including Robert Gooding-Williams (1998), Mills, Adrian Piper (1992), Michael Root (2000), and Iris Marion Young (1989) have turned their attention to this metaphysical question. In what follows, I argue that despite the progress these accounts represent, they nonetheless fail to arrive at an adequate constructionist account of race. The reason, I suggest, is that constructionists are committed to three mutually unsatisfiable constraints on an acceptable account of race, and no univocal account can satisfy all three. Faced with this failure, one might be tempted to abandon constructionism for racial skepticism. Another alternative is to abandon one or another of the proposed constraints in favor of an attenuated constructionism. I argue, however, that we need not choose between these alternatives. Once we set aside the worry about which account is appropriately considered an account of race, we see that skepticism and the various attenuated forms of constructionism are best understood not as metaphysical rivals at all. Rather, these positions share a broad base of metaphysical agreement.

Here’s how I proceed. In Section 1, I briefly discuss the widely endorsed view that race is not a biological natural kind. Then, in Section 2, I focus on whether constructionists can account for the phenomena of passing. Passing occurs whenever a member of some category is perceived (and allows herself to be perceived) as a member of another, mutually exclusive category, for example a white person passing as black, or a black person passing as white. Walter Benn Michaels (1994) charges that constructionist accounts of race cannot account for passing. I show how a constructionist account of race drawing on work by Gooding-Williams (1998), Mills (1998), and Piper (1992)—a version of what I call a thin account of race—can answer Michaels’s critique. In Section 3, I turn to discuss the claim by Root and others that race ‘does not travel’ beyond a particular cultural-historical site, and I will show that constructionists can make sense of such claims by endorsing an interactive kind account of race. Constructionists thus have ready answers for the challenges raised by passing and not traveling. Unfortunately, the two answers invoke two different accounts of what race is and thus do not provide us with a univocal account of race. For this reason, I consider a third, institutional account of race. Such an account, I suggest, can accommodate both passing and not traveling. But, in Section 4, I argue that institutional accounts fail to meet a third condition of adequacy on a constructionist account of race: accounting for the reality of race. I conclude that no single constructionist account of race can accommodate all the theoretical needs to which constructionists wish to put it. In Section 5, I argue that the failure to find a univocal constructionist account leads us to a variety of alternative accounts of race that abandon one or more of the adequacy constraints I have suggested. But rather than choose between these accounts, I argue the divisions among them are not metaphysically significant. In confronting racial phenomena, skepticism and the varieties of constructionism share a broad base of metaphysical agreement, and an adequate racial theory should exploit this agreement and work to distinguish all the features of racial phenomena that matter…

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Sources of Racialism

Journal of Social Philosophy
Volume 41, Issue 3 (Fall 2010)
Special Issue: New Thinking in Race Theory. Edited by Paul C. Taylor and Ronald Robles Sundstorm
pages 272–292
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01498.x

Ron Mallon, Associate Professor of Philosphy
University of Utah

Work in social philosophy on racial classification generally shares a commitment to “social constructionism” in two quite distinct senses of that term. In the first sense, to be constructionist is to hold that race (the subject of racial classification) does not exist as a biological kind in the way ordinary or folk ideas of race seem to assume and is therefore “merely a construction.” Call this constructionist view anti-racialism and the folk view it opposes racialism. As we understand it here, racialism involves the idea that humans can be divided into natural groups whose members have characteristic, unseen differences that explain group-typical properties, including physical, psychological and characterological properties, and anti-racialism is the denial of this view.

But much of this work is also committed to social constructionism in a quite different, empiricist sense: it holds that racial classification itself is primarily the product of social and cultural practices, which is to say that we (as individuals and as cultural groups) have the theoretical representations of race that we do, rather than some other theories or no theories at all because of historically and culturally specific conventions, decisions, practices, and so forth. Call this second sort of social constructionism representational constructionism.

Recent work by evolutionary and cognitive psychologists, anthropologists, and philosophers has posed a challenge to representational constructionism (e.g.. Gil-White 1999. 200la.b; Hirschfeld 1996; Kurzban. Tooby. and Cosmides 2001; Machery and Faucher 2005a.b). While these theorists join in the endorsement of anti-racialism, they go on to explain folk racial theories at least in part as the result of cognitive mechanisms which are culturally canalized, species-typical and domain-specific. To call them “culturally canalized” is here to say that they have a property associated with (and often considered a condition for) innateness: they develop stably across a wide range of different cultural environments.’To say they are “species-typical” is to say that, like having two arms and legs, eyes, ears. hair, and so forth, these cognitive capacities are traits that humans typically possess. And to say that they are “domain-specific” is to say that, unlike domain-general cognitive capacities (like memory, attention, or perception) that are employed across a wide range of problem domains, these mechanisms are specialized for solving a particular sort of problem. But while evolutionary-cognitive theorists hold that racial cognition is subserved by culturally canalized, domain-specific mechanisms that were shaped by evolution in ways that adapted them to solving certain problems, they do not hold that these mechanisms are adaptations for…

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‘Race’ as a scientific and organizational construct: a critique

GeoJournal
Volume 41, Number 3 (March 1997)
pages 233-243
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006881215239

Georges G. Cravins, Professor of Geography
University of Wisconsin, La Crosse

“Race” for many years has been a major construct of science and society. While its importance as such has not historically been particularly pronounced on a global scale, the emergence of its most forceful architects, the Anglophone countries, to pre-eminence since World War II has significantly extended its geographical range and added to its significance as an idea within commercialized culture as well as within social organization.

In the present paper, “race” is critically examined from the following angles: 1) its role in the behavioral and medical sciences; b) its historical origins and manifestations within the Anglophone countries, particularly the United States; and c) its emergence as a “liberal” concept and operating principle since World War II. Questions of why and how “race” arose and its continued use in science, society and culture drive both the trajectory and depth of this research. “Race” is found to be a modern construct which arose as a consequence of colonialism and slavery, and was substantially constructed in its present form and substance by England and its off-spring societies, particularly the United States. “Race” was not used as a term expressing a social idea until modern times, and had no basis in the primordial civilizations which greatly influenced modern Western societies (e.g., ancient Greece and Rome). Efforts undertaken by liberals – particularly in the United States – to “humanize” the concept of “race”since the 1960″s have been largely unsuccessful. “race” is viewed as inherently hierarchical, a fact which is evident from its historical and present role in science and society.

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a man believes himself to be the master of others who is, no less than they, slaves.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Control Social (1762)

In this paper. I shall discuss the involvement of modern Western societies with the concept of ‘race,’ focusing special attention on its developmental and functional manifestations within Anglophone societies. By Anglophone* is meant the cultures and countries of the English-speaking world, most especially the United States. Canada, Britain, South Africa and Australia. My primary aim is to render a critical perspective on ‘race’ as academic idea and social praxis, so as to argue against its continued use within the human and medical sciences as well as an element of social and political policy.

Montagu (1974. p. 3) has called ‘race’ the ‘witchcraft of our time’. ‘Race’ is not only an academic or ideological construct, but also a notion whose applied manifestations and consequences arc intellectually, socially, politically and economically significant. Indeed, it is possible to discern two distinct yet mutually-supporting channels through which ‘race’ has been historically articulated: 1) as an idea around which major academic debates have been constructed within scientific communities; and 2) as an organizational construct which has played a significant role in shaping personal world views, individual and group identities and primary social relations.

As a serious organizational construct, ‘race’ owes its existence principally to Western societies, particularly the Anglophone countries. Although educated populations in most non-Western societies today are aware of the existence of ‘races’, this awareness is generally owed to diffusion through Western influences rather than to autochthonal development. Moreover, in the extent to which it functions organizationally, ‘race’ is universal neither in its societal and spatial significance, nor in its historical origins and development. Indeed, divorced from the empirical reality of social hierarchies and class divisions, and the day-to-day conflict it engenders within certain Western societies, race is meaningless, as it has long lost its significance on purely scientific grounds.

The consideration of ‘race’ in the pages that…

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Onerous passions: colonial anti-miscegenation rhetoric and the history of sexuality

Patterns of Prejudice
Volume 45, Issue 4, 2011
pages 319-340
DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2011.605843

Nadine Ehlers, Visiting Assistant Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Ehlers’s analysis revisits Foucauldian conceptualizations of the history of sexuality in order to map the inextricability of race, gender and sexuality as they emerged in the context of the early American colonies. The salience of such an analysis lies in its ability to extend the terrain of Foucault’s history, and brings new considerations to bear regarding the specific configurations of race, gender and sexual intersections in North American history. If, as Foucault insists, sexuality is a set of effects produced in bodies, behaviours and social relations, Ehlers reorients these claims to consider how these effects were racialized within the rubric of colonial anti-miscegenation rhetoric. Through such a tracing, it becomes evident that, from the early colonial context, sexuality was deployed to produce ‘ideal’ sexuality as a bastion of whiteness: that is, to configure and maintain ‘ideal’ sexuality as white.

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Reconstructing Race: A Discourse-Theoretical Approach to a Normative Politics of Identity

The Philosophical Forum
Volume 43, Issue 1 (Spring 2012)
pages 27–49
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2011.00409.x

Andrew J. Pierce
Loyola University, Chicago

The claim that race is “socially constructed” has become something of a platitude in social science and philosophy. At a minimum, such a claim means to reject the notion that conceptions of race have some biological or “scientific” foundation and suggests instead that the notion of race is a purely human invention—a conventional way of ordering societies rather than a natural fact about the world. But the political and normative implications of this basic agreement are far from clear. Some have taken it to mean that we ought to stop talking about “races” as though they were real and work to develop other kinds of identifications to replace so-called “racial” identities. Others have suggested that though race may not be ontologically real, political structures that take races as basic make race an unavoidable social reality, such that as a matter of political practice, it is unwise to eliminate talk of race. And others still have argued that racial identity can be reinterpreted in such a way as to shed its deterministic connotations, but retain important features that have come to flourish under the oppressive force of, say, black identity. In short, the fact that race is “socially constructed,” important an insight as it is, tells us relatively little about what role, if any, race ought to play in a more just social order and in the construction of healthy collective identities. This paper aims to get clear on the normative implications of the “social construction” thesis, not just for political practice in nonideal societies where racial oppression remains, but in “ideal” (presumably nonracist) societies as well. That is, I am interested in the question of whether race and/or racial identity would have any legitimate place in an ideally just society, or to state it another way, whether the concept of race can be extricated from the history of racial oppression from which it arose. The position I defend is a version of what has come to be called a “conservationist” view. I argue that racial identities could be normatively justified based upon modified principles of discourse (which, I argue, are appropriately applied to contexts of collective identity formation), though I do not endorse the stronger claim that racial identities are an inevitable feature of any form of social organization that societies now structured by race could aspire to, as some other conservationists claim. Moreover, I do not take conservationism to imply that future racial groups would be the same as current racial groups, a point I illustrate through an analysis of whiteness.

…CONSTRUCTIVISM, ELIMINATIVISM, AND CONSERVATIONISM

The social construction thesis has led some to argue that since the concept of race has no real referent (and moreover, since “race-thinking” is often morally problematic), it should be discarded altogether. Kwame Anthony Appiah, one of the most fervent proponents of this kind of eliminativism, argues succinctly that “there are no races. There is nothing in the world we can ask race to do for us,” in short, that race “refers to nothing in the world at all.” Given, in other words, that modern science has failed to identify any discrete entities called “races,” use of the term lacks a referent and so is, strictly speaking, meaningless. Continued employment of the term rests on a conceptual mistake, one that is frequently morally pernicious besides.

But one may wonder, does the lack of a scientific foundation for race really mean that our everyday race terms lack reference? After all, do we not know who we mean when we talk about blacks, whites, Latinos, etc.? Perhaps not. Naomi Zack shares Appiah’s skepticism about the existence of races, and in Race and Mixed Race, she provides similar arguments to show that race has no scientific foundation and further, that folk criteria of race, which attribute racial membership based primarily upon heredity, fail to achieve their purported goal of completeness (such that all persons would have a designated racial membership) since mixed-race persons do not fit within their classificatory scope, and further, since there is no defensible way to distinguish mixed race persons from “pure” race persons. For example, there is no logical reason why a person with three white grandparents and one black one should be considered black, while a person with three black grandparents and one white one should not be considered white. And insofar as most if not all persons in racialized societies like the U.S. (not to mention Latin American nations) are “mixed” to some degree, then folk criteria of racial membership are fatally flawed as well.

But there are good reasons for hesitating to make the leap from this ontological claim (that races do not exist) to the normative claim that we should retire racial categories from our vocabulary, and so, presumably, from our laws and policies as well. This hesitance is based on the recognition that racial categories are useful for picking out, for example, “persons whose ancestors were victims of American chattel slavery,” and who might have legitimate moral claims based on that ancestry. That is, one intuitively plausible answer to the question, “why continue to talk about ‘races’ if there are no such thing?” is that, though race is not “real” in any ultimate metaphysical sense, it is still an important concept for understanding contemporary social reality, given that racial categories still structure the experiences of individuals and the functioning of institutions in “racialized” societies. One need not believe in God to understand the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition (or to use Appiah’s example, one need not believe in witches to understand the functioning of the concept of witchcraft in early colonial New England). One can continue to hold that such concepts have a social reality, even if one denies that they are real in the deeper senses above. In relation to race, such a position has come to be called constructivism. Racial constructivists accept that race has no biological foundation, yet they argue that as a result of human action and the widespread, consequential successes of pseudoscientific and folk theories of race, race has come to be inscribed in the institutions and practices of contemporary societies in ways that cannot be illuminated without recourse to some conception of race. Accordingly, they hold that race does have a sociohistorical reality, even if it cannot be linked to biologically significant “racial” differences…

…APPLICATIONS: MESTIZO AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY

Is it the case, one might wonder, that whites, when confronted with a confusing array of diverse racial identities, might simply “shrug and call themselves white?” That is, could whiteness continue to exist as an option for racial identification under nonracist conditions, and if not, what options does this leave for persons traditionally considered white? The question is an especially pressing one if collective identity is of the kind of constitutive importance that many have argued it is, and since one might think that the lack of a positive reconstruction of white racial identity leaves a void that is too often filled by traditionally racist, white supremacist conceptions of whiteness. The answer, I believe, is that white identity is not discursively justifiable, mainly because it is inherently coercive and exclusionary, failing, at least, the first and fourth conditions of discourse. Yet, I will argue this lack of justification need not cause too much worry since white identity lacks the intersubjective resources and benefits of other kinds of collective identity, such that, in the absence of other, illegitimate kinds of benefits (i.e., all of the economic, political, psychological, and social benefits associated with being in a position of relative dominance) one would not expect it to remain of much value to those it purported to describe anyway. That is, in precise opposition to the standard view that sees whiteness as the norm and nonwhiteness as the deviation or exception, I will argue that white identity is actually the anomalous identity, one that, when uncoupled from the system of racial oppression in which it formed, fails to provide the benefits typical of collective identity. If this is true, then one should expect that white identity would eventually be replaced by more useful and democratic forms of collective identification. The outlines of such alternatives are already visible even in our own society and demonstrate that the illegitimacy of white racial identity does not leave white people “marooned” without any resources for collective identification.

In order to begin to understand why white racial identity is illegitimate, one must understand its history, and the conditions under which it formed. Presumably, white racial identity stands in some relation to European heritage, though one should be cautious about equating the two. Previous to the eighteenth century, the idea of race as denoting specific lines of descent still marked a division between the “noble races” of European stock and their ignoble, though nonetheless similarly pigmented, countrymen. At its most general, this idea of race allowed for a commonality among nations or peoples, circumscribing the membership of the French, German, or English “races.” It was only in the New World, where English and other Europeans were confronted with the reality of slavery, that whiteness came to denote a commonality among Europeans of different types. Putatively setting aside old and deeply ingrained internal inequalities, the express purpose of such an identity was to distinguish the free European from the enslaved African, based upon the latter’s supposedly inherent dependency. In this way, slavery could be reconciled with the nascent values of liberalism. This opposition of slave and freeman is at the root of the U.S.’s binary racial system, a system into which successive waves of immigrants would be forced to assimilate…

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Reflections: An Anthology of African-American Philosophy, 1st Edition

Cengage Learning
2000
464 pages
Paperback ISBN-10: 0534573932  ISBN-13: 9780534573935

Edited by:

James Montmarquet, Professor of Philosophy
Tennessee State University

William Hardy, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion
Tennessee State University

This anthology provides the instructor with a sufficient quantity, breadth, and diversity of materials to be the sole text for a course on African-American philosophy. It includes both classic and more contemporary readings by both professional philosophers and other people with philosophically intriguing viewpoints. The material provided is diverse, yet also contains certain themes which instructors can effectively employ to achieve the element of unity. One such theme, the debate of the “nationalist” focus on blackness vs. the many critics of this focus, runs through a great number of issues and readings.

Table of Contents

• Preface.
• Introduction.
• PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS-RACE AND RACISM.
  • 1. W.E.B. DuBois: From The Souls of Black Folk.
  • 2. Molefi K. Asante: Racism, Consciousness, and Afrocentricity.
  • 3. Kwame Anthony Appiah: Racisms.
  • 4. J. L. A. Garcia: The Heart of Racisms. Contemporary Issue: Views on “Mixed Race”.
  • 5. Naomi Zack: Mixed Black and White Race and Public Policy.
  • 6. Lewis R. Gordon: Race, Biraciality, and Mixed Race-In Theory.
• PART TWO: MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY-NATIONALISM, SEPARATISM, AND ASSIMILATION.
  • 7. Martin R. Delaney: The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored Peoples of the United States.
  • 8. Frederick Douglass: The Future of the Negro, The Future of the Colored Race, The Nation’s Problem, and On Colonization.
  • 9. Marcus Garvey: From Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey.
  • 10. Maulana Karenga: The Nguzo Saba (The Seven Principles): Their Meaning and Message.
  • 11. Molefi K. Asante: The Afrocentric Idea in Education.
  • 12. Cornel West: The Four Traditions of Response. Contemporary Issue: “Ebonics”.
  • 13. Geneva Smitherman: Black English/Ebonics: What it Be Like?
  • 14. Milton Baxter: Educating Teachers about Educating the Oppressed. Feminism, Womanism, and Gender Relations.
  • 15. Sojourner Truth: Ain’t I a Woman?
  • 16. Patricia Hill Collins: The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought.
  • 17. bell hooks: Reflections on Race and Sex.
  • 18. Angela P. Harris: Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory.
  • 19. Charles W. Mills: Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women? Contemporary Issue: Women’s Rights and Black Nationalism.
  • 20. E. Francis White: Africa on My Mind: Gender, Counterdiscourse, and African American Nationalism.
  • 21. Amiri Baraka: Black Woman. Violence, Liberation, and Social Justice.
  • 22. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Letter from a Birmingham Jail.
  • 23. Malcolm X: Message to the Grass Roots.
  • 24. Howard McGary: Psychological Violence, Physical Violence, and Racial Oppression.
  • 25. Laurence M. Thomas: Group Autonomy and Narrative Identity. Contemporary Issue: Affirmative Action.
  • 26. Bernard Boxill: Affirmative Action.
  • 27. Shelby Steele: Affirmative Action. Ethics and Value Theory.
  • 28. Alain Locke: Values and Imperatives.
  • 29. Michele M. Moody-Adams: Race, Class, and the Social Construction of Self-Respect.
  • 30. Laurence M. Thomas: Friendship.
  • 31. Cornel West: Nihilism in Black America.
  • 32. Katie G. Cannon: Unctuousness as a Virtue: According to the Life of Zora Neale Hurston. Contemporary Issue: A Classic Question of Values, Rights, and Education.
  • 33. Booker T. Washington: Atlanta Exposition Address.
  • 34. W.E.B. DuBois: The Talented Tenth.
• PART THREE: PHILOSOPHY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES.
  • 35. Patricia J. Williams: Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights.
  • 36. Regina Austin: Sapphire Bound!
  • 37. Derrick Bell: Racial Realism-After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch.
  • 38. John Arthur: Critical Race Theory: A Critique. Contemporary Issue: Racist Hate Speech.
  • 39. Charles Lawrence and Gerald Gunther: Prohibiting Racist Speech: A Debate. Aesthetics.
  • 40. James Baldwin: Everybody’s Protest Novel.
  • 41. Larry Neal: The Black Arts Movement.
  • 42. Angela Y. Davis: Billy Holiday’s “Strange Fruit”: Music and Social Consciousness.
  • 43. Ralph Ellison: Blues People. Contemporary Issue: Rap Music.
  • 44. Crispin Sartwell: Rap Music and the Uses of Stereotype.
  • 45. Kimberle Crenshaw: Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew. Philosophy and Theology.
  • 46. David Walker: David Walker’s Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World, and Very Expressly, to Those of the United stated.
  • 47. James H. Cone: God and Black Theology.
  • 48. Victor Anderso: Ontological Blackness in Theology.
  • 49. Anthony Pinn: Alternative Perspectives and Critiques. Contemporary Issue: Womanist Theology and the Traditionalist Black Church.
  • 50. Cheryl J. Sanders: Christian Ethics and Theology in a Womanist Perspective.
  • 51. Delores Williams: Womanist Reflections on “the Black Church,” the African-American Denominational Churches and the Universal Hagar’s Spiritual Church.
• SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING.

Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization

Palgrave Macmillan
May 2011
232 pages
ebook ISBN: 9780230305243
Print ISBNs: 9780230298286 HB 9780230318519
DOI: 10.1057/9780230305243

Amar Acheraïou

This book offers an accessible, in-depth analysis of hybridity as a practice, discourse, and ideological construction. Its scope ranges widely, encompassing conceptualizations of hybridity from ancient Greece and Rome to the present. The views of such key figures as Plato, Aristotle, Alexander the Great, Virgil, Gobineau, Renan, and Tocqueville, as well as Bakhtin, Fanon, and Bhabha are all freshly reassessed. The ground-breaking perspectives provided reorient contemporary debates on hybridity and the ‘Third Space’. They significantly widen our awareness of the history of métissage and expand the methodological, conceptual, empirical, and ideological orientations of contemporary hybridity theorists.

Acheraïou deftly examines the questions of race, class, identity, binarism, postmodernist ideology, neoliberalism, and globalization. In particular, he recommends decolonizing postcolonialism, indicating ways to transcend the cultural and spatial turn predetermining current discussions of métissage, culture, and identity politics. Throughout, he analyzes hybridity in the light of globalization, suggesting how postcolonialism could become a genuinely counter-hegemonic mode of resistance to global neoliberal doxa.

Contents

• Introduction
• PART I Hybridity: A Historical Overview from Antiquity to Modern Times
  • 1 Métissage, Ideology, and Politics in Ancient Discourses
    • 1.1 Cultural, political, and scientific métissage in antiquity
    • 1.2 Reflexive and strategic hybridism
    • 1.3 Ancient literary, political, and philosophical perceptions of hybridity
  • 2 Myths of Purity and Mixed Marriages from Antiquity to the Middle Ages
  • 3 Interracial Relationships and the Economy of Power in Modern Empires
    • 3.1 Syncretism in modern colonial politics and ideology
    • 3.2 Métissage: a double-edged colonial weapon
    • 3.3 Sexual politics, from tolerance to abjuration: the case of the British East India Company
    • 3.4 Hybridity as the space of the impossible: the eighteenth and nineteenth-century Caribbean
• PART II Hybridity in Contemporary Theory: A Critical Assessment
  • 4 The Ethos of Hybridity Discourse
  • 5 Critical Perspectives on Hybridity and the Third Space
  • 6 Class, Race, and Postcolonial Hybridity Discourse
  • 7 Postcolonial Discourse, Postmodernist Ethos: Neocolonial Complicities
  • 8 Hybridity Discourse and Binarism
  • 9 The Global and the Postcolonial: Uneasy Alliance
    • 9.1 An overview of globalization: hegemony and resistance
    • 9.2 Empirical and theoretical insights into postcolonial and global relationships
  • 10 Hybridity Discourse and Neoliberalism/Neocolonialism
  • 11 Decolonizing Postcolonial Discourse
• Notes
• Works Cited
• Index

Identity Politics in the Public Realm: Bringing Institutions Back In

University of British Columbia Press
2011-10-11
308 pages
Hardcover ISBN: 9780774820813   

Edited by:

Avigail Eisenberg, Professor of Political Science
University of Victoria

Will Kymlicka, Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy
Queen’s University

In an age of multiculturalism and identity politics, many minority groups seek some form of official recognition or public accommodation of their identity. But can public institutions accurately recognize or accommodate something as subjective and dynamic as “identity?” Are there coherent standards and fair procedures for responding to identity claims?

In this book, Avigail Eisenberg and Will Kymlicka lead a distinguished team of scholars who explore state responses to identity claims worldwide. Their case studies focus on key issues where identity is central to public policy—such as the construction of census categories, interpretation of antidiscrimination norms, and assessment of indigenous rights—and assess the influence of democratization on the capacity of institutions to respond to group claims. By illuminating both the risks and opportunities of institutional responses to diversity, this volume shows that public institutions can either enhance or distort the benefits of identity politics. Much depends on the agency of citizens and the ability of institutions to adapt to success and failure.

Table of Contents

• Preface
• 1. Bringing Institutions Back In: How Public Institutions Assess Identity / Avigail Eisenberg and Will Kymlicka
• 2. The Challenge of Census Categorization in the Post—Civil Rights Era / Melissa Nobles
• 3. Knowledge and the Politics of Ethnic Identity and Belonging in Colonial and Postcolonial States / Bruce J. Berman
• 4. Defining Indigeneity: Representation and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 in the Philippines / Villia Jefremovas and Padmapani L. Perez
• 5. Indigenous Rights in Latin America: How to Classify Afro-Descendants? / Juliet Hooker
• 6. Domestic and International Norms for Assessing Indigenous Identity / Avigail Eisenberg
• 7. The Challenge of Naming the Other in Latin America / Victor Armony
• 8. From Immigrants to Muslims: Shifting Categories of the French Model of Integration / Eléonore Lépinard
• 9. Beliefs and Religion: Categorizing Cultural Distinctions among East Asians / André Laliberté
• 10. Assessing Religious Identity in Law: Sincerity, Accommodation, and Harm / Lori G. Beaman
• 11. Reasonable Accommodations and the Subjective Conception of Freedom of Conscience and Religion / Jocelyn Maclure
• Contributors
• Index

Rethinking Race History: The Role of the Albino in the Frence Enlightenment Life Sciences

History and Theory
Volume 48, Issue 3 (October 2009)
pages 151–179
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2303.2009.00502.x

Andrew Curran, Professor of Romance Languages & Literatures
Wesleyan University

The scholarly quest to recover the construction of racial difference in the Enlightenment-era life sciences generally overlooks a singular fact: the vast majority of eighteenth-century thinkers who were engaged in theorizing the human were often far more preoccupied with preserving a belief in an essential human sameness than they were in creating categories of essential difference. This article charts the problem of a potential human sameness as it related to questions of category, biological processes, and the human and non-human through an examination of a neglected and key construct in the eighteenth-century life sciences, the albino. The albino was absorbed into a scientific narrative in 1744 when Maupertuis used the concept to put forward a theory of shared origins or monogenesis. Positing that the nègre blanc—quite literally a “white Negro”—was a racial throwback, a reversion to a primitive whiteness, Maupertuis inspired a new generation of thinkers, most notably the great French naturalist Buffon, to assert categorically that blacks had degenerated from a prototype white variety. The significance of the concept nègre blanc, which has not been studied sufficiently, cannot be overestimated. In addition to the fact that the new role of the nègre blanc clearly said as much about whiteness as it did about blackness, the albino generated a new diagnostic chronology of the human species.

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Fifty years after Frantz Fanon: beyond diversity

Advances in Psychiatric Treatment
Volume 18, Number 1 (January 2012)
pages 25-31
DOI: 10.1192/apt.bp.110.008847

Adedapo Sikuade

Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), a West Indian of mixed race, was a French colonial psychiatrist trained in Lyon, France, who worked mainly in colonial North Africa between 1953 and 1957. He was one of the earliest psychiatrists to suggest that the lived experience of ethnic minorities within a discriminatory colonial environment could trigger mental illness. This article focuses on Fanon’s work and contributions to psychiatry, as well as his philosophy, advocacy for social inclusion and pioneering work in culturally relevant rehabilitation. It also examines what lessons could be learnt from his life’s work as a psychiatrist and traces his influence on a generation of psychiatric researchers, suggesting how his contribution may have influenced critical thought and current views.

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