Mixed Race Studies

Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification

Georgetown Law Journal
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
Volume 102, Issue 5 (2014)
pages 1501-1572

Camille Gear Rich, Associate Professor of Law
University of Southern California, Gould School of Law

This Article posits that we are in a key moment of discursive and ideological transition, an era in which the model of elective race is ascending, poised to become one of the dominant frameworks for understanding race in the United States. Because we are in a period of transition, many Americans still are wedded to fairly traditional attitudes about race. For these Americans, race is still an objective, easily ascertainable fact determined by the process of involuntary racial ascription—how one’s physical traits are racially categorized by third parties. The elective-race framework will challenge these Americans to recognize other ways in which people experience race, including acts of voluntary affiliation as well as selective and conditional affiliations. Importantly, even if one concludes that most Americans still hold traditional, ascriptive-based understandings of race, there is evidence that elective race is steadily gaining influence in certain quarters, shaping government institutions’ formal procedures as well as certain Americans’ racial understandings.

To improve the clarity and precision of discussions about elective race, this Article outlines the key premises and norms associated with this ideological framework. My primary goal is to help courts and scholars understand the basic tenets and tensions that are likely to be present in plaintiffs’ elective-race claims. Although some scholars have trivialized racial self-identification interests or represented them as a threat to antidiscrimination law, my project is to show that racial self-identification decisions matter in concrete ways because they can trigger serious race-based social sanctions that are a core antidiscrimination law concern. Indeed, as we will see, voluntary racial-affiliation decisions can and do trigger race-based resentment, rejection, and social sanction when race-based resentment, rejection, and social sanction when they do not match certain expected or established American understandings about the boundaries of racial categories. Moreover, I predict that, though the number of cases that sound in the nature of elective race may be small at present, we should expect to see more cases of this kind given both the increased focus Americans place on the interest in racial self-identification and the shift toward institutional protocols that are intended to accommodate this interest. The elective-race cases will challenge courts, forcing them to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) should recognize the autonomy claims of individuals who are injured in the workplace by the social and formal processes of involuntary racialization. Courts will be asked to rule on cases that suggest that an employee’s dignity interests are unjustly frustrated when other fail to respect the employee’s right to racial self-definition.

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Disparate Impact

Georgetown Law Journal
Volume 98, Issue 4 (2010)
pages 1133-1163

Girardeau A. Spann, Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center

Introduction

There has been a lot of talk about post-racialism since the 2008 election of Barack Obama as the first black President of the United States. Some have argued that the Obama election illustrates the evolution of the United States from its unfortunate racist past to a more admirable post-racial present in which the problem of invidious racial discrimination has largely been overcome. Others have argued that the Obama election illustrates only that an extraordinarily gifted, mixed-race, multiple Ivy League graduate. Harvard Law Review President was able to overcome the persistent discriminatory racial practices that continue to disadvantage the bulk of less fortunate racial minority group members in the United States.

However, both perspectives fail to engage the feature of race in the United States that I find most significant. Race is relentlessly relevant. Racial differences are so socially salient that racial considerations necessarily influence many of the decisions that we make. Even when racial considerations are tacit or unconscious, the influence of race is still exerted through the reflex habit of deferring to white interests in the belief that such deference is racially neutral. But it is not. The possibility of actual colorblind race neutrality is simply an option that does not exist.

Nevertheless, the culture remains committed to an abstract principle of racial equality, which would be offended by a frank recognition of the role that race inevitably plays in the allocation of societal benefits and burdens. Accordingly, the culture must find some way to mediate the tension that exists between its race-neutral rhetorical aspirations and its race-based operational behavior. The claim that United States culture has now achieved a post-racial status can best be understood as an effort to serve that function. By conceptualizing contemporary culture as post-racial, we can camouflage the role that race continues to play in the allocation of resources. However, masking the relevance of race does not serve to eliminate it. Rather, the post-racial claim ultimately serves to legitimate the practice of continued discrimination against racial minorities.

The Supreme Court has always been complicit in the practice of sacrificing racial minority interests for the benefit of the white majority. In its more infamous historical decisions, such as Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu, the Court’s racial biases have been relatively transparent. More recently, however, the Court has invoked three tacit post-racial assumptions to justify the contemporary sacrifice of minority interests in the name of promoting equality for whites. First, current racial minorities are no longer the victims of significant discrimination. Second, as a result, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities at the expense of whites constitute a form of reverse discrimination against whites that must be prevented in the name of racial equality. Third, because the post-racial playing field is now level, any disadvantages that racial minorities continue to suffer must be caused by their own shortcomings rather than by the lingering effects of now-dissipated past discrimination. I consider actions that are rooted in these assumptions, and that adversely affect the interests of racial minorities in order to advance the interests of whites, to constitute a form of contemporary discrimination that I refer to as “post-racial discrimination.”…

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“The Caucasian Cloak”: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the Twentieth-Century Southwest

The Georgetown Law Journal
Volume 95, Issue 2
Pages 337-392

Ariela J. Gross, Professor of Law and History
University of Southern California Law School

The history of Mexican Americans and Jim Crow in the Southwest suggests the danger of allowing state actors or private entities to discriminate on the basis of language or cultural practice. Race in the Southwest was produced through the practices of Jim Crow, which were not based explicitly on race, but rather on language and culture inextricably tied to race. This Article looks at three sets of encounters between Mexican Americans and the state in mid-twentieth-century Texas and California—trials involving miscegenation, school desegregation, and jury exclusion—to see the way in which state actors used Mexican Americans’ nominal white identity under the law to create and protect Jim Crow practices. First, it argues that whiteness operated primarily as a “Caucasian cloak” to obscure the practices of Jim Crow and to make them appear benign, whether in the jury or school context. If Mexican Americans were white, then they were represented so long as whites were represented. Second, it demonstrates that Mexican-American civil rights leaders as well as ordinary individuals in the courtroom did not simply identify as white; some showed a more complex understanding of “Mexican” as a mestizo race, and others pointed to the idea of race as a status produced by racist practice. Mexicans were nonwhite if they were treated as nonwhite under Jim Crow. Finally, it argues that, at least in twentieth-century Texas and California, cultural discrimination was racial discrimination, and that continuing discrimination on the basis of language ability and other cultural attributes should be scrutinized carefully under antidiscrimination law…

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION
MEXICAN-AMERICAN WHITENESS BEFORE 1930
A. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
B. WHITE BY TREATY—IN RE RODRIGUEZ
C. SEX ACROSS RACIAL BORDERS: POPULAR AND LEGAL IDEAS OF THE “MEXICAN RACE”

II. THE POLITICS OF WHITENESS IN THE 1930S AND 1940S
A. JIM CROW IN THE SOUTHWEST
B. MEXICAN-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS

III. LITIGATING MEXICAN-AMERICAN WHITENESS
A. THE 1930S SCHOOL AND JURY CASES
B. THE 1940S SCHOOL AND JURY CASES

IV. AFTER HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS: LIFTING THE CAUCASIAN CLOAK
A. FROM HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS TO CISNEROS
B. LA RAZA COSMICA

CONCLUSION

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