Mixed Race Studies

Philosophy of race meets population genetics

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
Volume 52, August 2015
pages 46–55
Genomics and Philosophy of Race
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.04.003

Quayshawn Spencer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania

Highlights

• I discuss the recent human population-genetic research that has revived biological racial realism.
• I summarize four semantic and metaphysical objections to the new biological racial realism.
• I show that each objection stems from an implausible semantic or metaphysical assumption.
• I provide 3 suggestions for how to productively move forward in the debate.

In this paper, I respond to four common semantic and metaphysical objections that philosophers of race have launched at scholars who interpret recent human genetic clustering results in population genetics as evidence for biological racial realism. I call these objections ‘the discreteness objection’, ‘the visibility objection’, ‘the very important objection’, and ‘the objectively real objection.’ After motivating each objection, I show that each one stems from implausible philosophical assumptions about the relevant meaning of ‘race’ or the nature of biological racial realism. In order to be constructive, I end by offering some advice for how we can productively critique attempts to defend biological racial realism based on recent human genetic clustering results. I also offer a clarification of the relevant human-population genetic research.

A Radical Solution to the Race Problem

Philosophy of Science
Volume 81, Number 5 (December 2014)
pages 1025-1038
DOI: 10.1086/677694

Quayshawn Spencer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania

It has become customary among philosophers and biologists to claim that folk racial classification has no biological basis. This paper attempts to debunk that view. In this paper, I show that ‘race’, as used in current U.S. race talk, picks out a biologically real entity. I do this by, first, showing that ‘race’, in this use, is not a kind term, but a proper name for a set of human population groups. Next, using recent human genetic clustering results, I show that this set of human population groups is a partition of human populations that I call ‘the Blumenbach partition’.

Read or purchase the article here.

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

Philosophical Studies
June 2012, Volume 159, Issue 2
pages 181-204
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9697-2

Quayshawn Spencer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ‘biological racial realism’. Some philosophers mean that ‘race is a natural kind in biology’, while others mean that ‘race is a real biological kind’. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ‘biological racial realism’ is one that interprets ‘biological racial realism’ as ‘race is a genuine kind in biology’, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ‘biological racial realism’ in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.

Read or purchase the article here. Read the author’s manuscript here.